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LAWRENCE C. BECKER

I.

Human Being:
The Boundaries
of the Concept

PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION

Uncertainty about our ability to define the biological boundaries of
human life is familiar. Currently, the most prominent issue is the
definition of death-specifically whether to retain the traditional cardiopulmonary criteria for death or to adopt some version of so-called
brain-death criteria. The law in some jurisdictions has already begun
to permit physicians to pronounce death on a finding of "irreversible
coma." And though it is clear that transplant surgery and the development of life-support technology have given impetus to the change, a
number of writers have taken pains to argue that it is perfectly sound,
conceptually, to redefine death.
Problems with the definition of the beginning of human life are
even more frequently rehearsed. There are advocates of the biological
life-cycle account, various developmental views, theological ensoulment theories, and "personhood" definitions. The United States Supreme Court has recently accepted the view that no conclusive reasons
can be found for settling on anyone of these rather than another.
The importance of these definitional questions for moral philosophy
is obvious. Human beings protect themselves with a thicket of rights
they do not grant to other beings, and some of these rights are said to
Earlier versions of this paper were read to the Conference on Moral Problems
in Medicine, sponsored by the Council for Philosophical Studies, and to the
Philosophy Club of the University of Virginia. Thanks are due to members of
both groups for helpful comments, but my particular gratitude extends to Jean
W. Hitzeman, James E. Kennedy, Marvin Kohl, and George M. Brockway, who
saved me from some serious errors.
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be human rights-rights one has simply by virtue of being human.
Any conceptual uncertainty about when an entity has become or has
ceased to be human is a problem for the ascription of such rights.
Further, what might be called threshold homicides-the killing of
entities whose claim to being human is somewhat in doubt-have
become increasingly problematic. There are intraspecies threshold
questions (abortion, infanticide, some types of euthanasia) and interspecies threshold questions (the killing of other intelligent life forms).
I am concerned, here, with two propositions about the boundaries
of human life, each of which has a direct bearing on current controversies and perennial moral problems:
( I) That there is no decisive way to define, in purely biological
terms, either the point at which a human life begins, or the
point at which it ends.
(2) In any case, if the end points are going to be used as moral
divides, they should be defined in terms of morally relevant
characteristics, not purely biological ones.

My purpose is to attack both of these propositions by proposing what
I take to be decisive biological definitions of the boundaries and by
giving reasons for thinking that, for moral theory, such biological
definitions are preferable to "morally relevant" ones. The arguments
on the latter issue are fairly straightforward and need not be abstracted in this introduction. But the arguments for the boundary
definitions are a bit tortuous, so it may be worthwhile to give an
overview of them.
The line of argument for the becoming/being boundary may be
summarized as follows:
( I) Entry into the class of human beings is a process.
(2) The entry process is at least in part a biological one.
(3) The completion of the biological part of the entry process is a
necessary condition for the completion of the entry process
perse.
(4) The biological part of the entry process is developmental in
nature-the development of a set of living cells into a multicellular organism.
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(5) The developmental nature of the biological part of the entry
process is best understood by way of an analogy with metamorphosis-that is, as the genesis, from the relatively undifferentiated mass of the fertilized ovum, of the fundamental
morphology and histologically differentiated organs the organism is genetically programmed to develop.
( 6) The completion of what I shall call the metamorphic phase of
generative development is a necessary condition of the completion of the entry process-that is, the becoming/being
boundary cannot be put any earlier than this.
(7) There are no good reasons for putting the boundary any later
than this.
( 8) Therefore, the becoming/being boundary lies at the completion
of the metamorphic phase of generative development.
The line of argument for the being/has-been boundary is parallel:
( I) Exit from the class of human beings is a process.
(2) The exit process is at least in part a biological one.
(3) The completion of the biological part of the exit process is a
necessary condition for the completion of the exit process
per se.
(4) The biological part of the exit process is disintegrative in
nature.
(5) The disintegrative nature of the biological part of the exit
process is best construed as the functional diSintegration of
the organism as such-and not as the physical disintegration of
its parts.
(6) The completion of the disintegration of the organism as such
is a necessary condition for the completion of the exit processthat is, the being/has-been boundary cannot be put any earlier
than this.
(7) There are no good reasons for putting the boundary any later
than this.
( 8) Therefore, the being/has-been boundary lies at the completion
of the disintegration of the human being considered as a biological organism.
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Without further ado, then, I shall turn to the arguments for the becoming/being boundary.
II.

THE BECOMING/BEING BOUNDARY

A caterpillar is not a butterfly. That is, the insect of which the caterpillar is the larval stage is not, at the larval stage, a butterfly-though
one might, as indeed biologists do, speak of butterflies as "adult butterflies" in order to emphasize the fact that both caterpillars and butterflies are stages in the development of the same insect. Nonetheless
we do not confuse insects which are butterflies with insects of the
same species which are caterpillars. The latter are becoming butterflies
no doubt, but they are not butterflies yet.
When can we say that the insect is a butterfly as opposed to a
caterpillar (or rather, a pupa)? Surely we can say this only when
the process of metamorphosis is complete-that is, when the relatively
undifferentiated mass left by the disintegration of the caterpillar'S
tissues has metamorphosed into the pattern of differentiation we call
a butterfly.
Human fetal development is a process analogous to metamorphosis,
and just as it makes good sense to speak of butterfly eggs, larvae, and
pupae as distinct from the butterflies they become (to say that they
are not butterflies) so too it makes sense to say that human eggs,
embryos, and fetuses are distinct from the humans they become-that
they are not human beings, only human becomings.
When can we say that the fetus is a human being rather than a
human becoming? Surely only when its metamorphic-like process is
complete-that is, when the relatively undifferentiated mass of the
fertilized human ovum has developed into the pattern of differentiation characteristic of the organism it is genetically programmed to
become.
That is the core of what I have to say about the becoming/being
boundary. But it will require considerable elaboration and defense,
and it may help to note, to begin with, that the definitional problem
here is to clearly describe a concept of "being"-a static, or at any rate
reasonably stable, "completed" condition. This is not to say, of course,
that human beings are themselves static or unchanging. It is merely
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to indicate that we are looking for the boundaries which define membership in the class of living humans-and which distinguish that
class from the class of entities which might, but have not yet, become
humans, as well as from the class of entities which have been, but are
no longer, humans. In the case of the becoming/being boundary, then,
we are looking for a point at which the entity is in some very fundamental sense "completed" as a member of the species. I shall argue
in what follows that this point is reached when the organism (assumed, of course, to be living) has assumed its basic morphology, and
when its inventory of histologically differentiated organs is complete.
(It may be worth pointing out one subtlety here. I will argue that the
process is complete for a given organism when that organism's inventory of organs is complete-not when some standard list of human
organs is filled. This is done to account for mutants.)
The rationale for this point as the becoming/being boundary begins
with the straightforward observation that entry into the class of living
human beings is a process. The claim that "entry is a process" means
no more than that humans come into being by way of a process. This
process is, at least in part, a biological one-involving at a minimum
the production of an ovum in a suitable environment for parthenogenesis or cloning, and typically the production of both ovum and
sperm, together with the processes necessary for their union. Whatever else we may want to say about this process of entry, we have to
concede, surely, that the completion of its biological aspects is a
necessary condition of its completion per se. (Whether it is also a
sufficient condition will be discussed later.) Thus it is clear that the
becoming/being boundary cannot be put at a point prior to the
biological completion of the process of entry.
The starting point of the process is not in dispute here, though to
put it at conception would beg an important question. So assume that
the process starts well before conception-say, with the production of
the particular ovum which is to be fertilized (or perhaps "activated"
in the case of cloning). The question to be answered, then, is: At what
point do we have adequate reasons for saying that' the process is
biologically complete?
A standard answer is derived from the concept of a "life cycle." The
argument is that the life cycle of a human being begins at conception-
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just as the life cycle of a butterfly begins with a fertilized egg, progresses through the larval and pupal stages, and culminates in the
development of what is popularly described as a butterfly. The trouble
with the caterpillar/butterfly analogy as proposed above-according to
the life-cycle argument-is that it misleads one into thinking that
entry into the species coincides with the end of metamorphosis. Quite
the contrary: egg, larva, pupa, and butterfly are all stages in the
development of one entity of one species; just as conceptus, embryo,
fetus, neonate, infant, child, adolescent, and adult are all stages in
the development of one entity of the species homo sapiens. "Being" a
human thus begins at conception-at the beginning of the life cycle.
This is a rhetorically persuasive argument, but it contains both
logical and empirical errors. The fundamental logical error can be
seen most clearly by first considering the obviously fallacious syllogism (all too frequently taken seriously):
This conceptus is a being (Le. is an entity and is alive).
It is certainly human (Le. is of no other species).
Therefore, it is a human being.
The fallacy here is equivocation on the word "human." As used in the
premise it is an adjective-and as such applies not only to the conceptus but to any living part of a member of the species: human
blood; human sperm. But as used in the conclusion, "human" functions as a noun meaning "member of the species homo sapiens." A
counterexample will suffice to make the point.
This sperm cell is a being (Le. an entity and alive).
It is certainly human (Le. is of no other species ).
Therefore, it is a human being.
The fallacy in the life-cycle argument is not quite as blatant, but
it is similar. From the premise that fertilization of the ovum produces
a unique living entity which is a product of the species, it does not
follow that that entity is a member of the species. It is just as possible
to conclude that the entity produced by fertilization is one which will
become a member of the species.
The empirical error in the life-cycle definition utterly destroys its
plausibility as an account of the becoming/being boundary. Monozy-

34 0

Philosophy & Public Affairs

gotic twinning can occur any time from the two-cell stage to about
the fourteenth day after conception. And it is thought that most such
twinning is not genetically determined. 1 What this means is that one
cannot say at conception, even given complete knowledge of the
genetic makeup of the conceptus, how many humans will develop
from it. It surely will not do, therefore, to say that the process of becoming a human being ends at conception. 2
But if not at conception, then when? Shall we say that the becoming/being boundary lies at the point where the number of embryos is irrevocably determined? Shall we say that the life cycle of a
human being begins at that point? I think not-this time for purely
conceptual reasons.
It has already been noted that there is no logical necessity in the
inference from the premise that a unique, living, and human entity
exists to the conclusion that that entity is a human being-Leo a
member of the species as opposed to an entity in the process of becoming one. So we are certainly not forced to put the boundary at
the end of the twinning possibility. Indeed, I suggest that when we
reflect on the nature of human development, the only point for the
becoming/being boundary which makes conceptual sense is at the
end of what might be called its metamorphic phase. Some detail will
be helpful at this point.
1. See M.G. Bulmer, The Biology of Twinning in Man (Oxford, 1970), and
relevant passages from Max Levitan and Ashley Montagu, Textbook of Human
Genetics (New York, 1971). The importance of the issue of twinning was
brought to my attention by James M. Humber's paper, "The Immorality of
Abortion," presented at the Eastern Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association in December 1973. It should be noted, however, that at least
in terms of the arguments of that paper, Mr. Humber would apparently not agree
that this problem is a significant one for the conception definition.
2. One can, of course, assert the contrary by saying that once conception
occurs, nonbiological souls come into being, and that the number of souls thus
brought into being determines (or corresponds to) the number of fetuses which
will develop. One would then have to go on to identify the existence of the
souls with the existence of human beings. But one can assert the contrary of any
proposition whatsoever in this way-assuming the assertion is not self-contradictory. That is, one can merely invent an alternative. The question is, what
reasons can be offered to support the truth of such an alternative claim? I shall
assume here-and it is surely not an arbitrary assumption-that no philosophically defensible reasons can be found to support the "nonbiological soul" alternative in this context.
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"Biological development" is a very broadly defined term. One writer
says: "Development may be defined as the action of genes in: (I)
creating a new organism from some part of a parent organism, (2)
maintaining or increasing the size of a fully formed mature organism,
and (3) repairing accidental defects or losses in an organism. . . ."3
It is clear that the first category above is the sort of development of
concern to us here. Let us call it (human) generative development,
to distinguish it from the other sorts, which are typically referred to
as continuous development and regenerative development, respectively.
Human generative development involves four sorts of processes:
(a) cell proliferation, in which the number of cells increases; (b)
growth, in which there is an increase in the mass of the developing
organism; (c) morphogenesis, in which progressive changes in form
take place; and (d) histogenesis, in which cells specialize into tissues.
Morphogenesis and histogenesis are often lumped together under the
title differentiation.
Differentiation, cell proliferation, and growth are all involved in
continuous and regenerative development as well as in generative
development, of course. The continuous production of red blood cells
throughout life is an example of histogenesis. Obviously, to speak of
the sort of completion indicated by the becoming/being boundary is
not to speak of the completion of such processes of maintenance and
regeneration-however similar they are in kind to the processes of
generative development. It is rather (at least in part) to speak of the
completion of the process of the generation of a new (human)
organism.
But what is the nature of this process, and when is it complete?
While the distinction between the generation, maintenance, and regeneration of an organism is reasonably clear at the most abstract
level, how is one to give it application in the case of human development? It is here that the analogy to metamorphosis is helpful.
In common biological usage, "metamorphosis" doubtless refers to
the sort of transformations undergone by the developing butterflywhere there is first the generation of a free-living larval body distinctly
different from the adult, then the de-differentiation of the tissues of
3. Nelson T. Spratt, Jr., Developmental Biology (Belmont, Calif., :197:1), p. 5.
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that body and the subsequent generation of the adult. But biologists
who have addressed themselves to examining the nature of this process characterize it in a way which, without strain, fits human fetal
development. Embryonic and metamorphic development are often
spoken of conjointly.4 In fact, as one writer classifies types of metamorphosis, a distinct larval body is not required at all-and thus
human generative development sits comfortably as a type of metamorphosis. 5
Now it is clear that generative development has both what might
be called fundamental aspects and aspects which are essentially refinements of or maturation of the basic structures of the organism.
The neonate has a skeletal system of about 270 bones. "Fusion of
some of these in infancy reduces this number slightly, but from then
until puberty there is a steady increase ... at puberty there are 350
separate bony masses, and this number is increased still further
during adolescence. Thereafter, fusions again bring about a reduction
to the final quota of 206 . . . ."6 Similarly with gametogenesis. 06gonia
in the female and spermatogonia in the male are present before birth,
but their maturation into full-fledged ova (Le. o6tids) and spermatozoa
only comes about at puberty. In the case of the lungs, the alveolar
ducts are present in the fetus, but only after birth do the alveoli
proper develop, and continue to proliferate well into the eighth year
of childhood. 7 Examples of such refinement and maturation of structures-undeniably a part of generative development-could be multiplied.
But the original analogy to metamorphosis is instructive here. Just
as it is not the size of the entity, or whether its cells are proliferating,
4. Ibid., p. 17; and the following: "Metamorphosis is a widespread developmental phenomenon which is usually associated with a dramatic change in
habitat and consequent way of life. . .. Primarily it consists of the differential
destruction of certain tissues, accompanied by an increase in growth and differentiation of other tissues. The phenomenon of regional growth and differentiation associated with local cell death in developing limbs comes into this category." N. J. Berrill, Developmental Biology (New York, 1971), pp. 423-424.
5. Spratt, Developmental Biology, pp. 283-284, quoting Weiss, The Science of
Zoology (New York, 1966).
6. L.B. Arey, Developmental Anatomy, 7th ed. (Philadelphia, 1965), p. 405.
7. See J.B. Thomas, Introduction to Human Embryology (Philadelphia, 1968),
P·297·
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which is at stake in our judgment that the pupa has become a butterfly, so too we are not concerned with various refinements, adaptations
to environment outside the cocoon, and maturation which might take
place in the butterfly's basic structure. Metamorphosis-at least in
the sense relevant to drawing the line between pupa and butterflyis complete once these basic structures are complete. Similarly for
humans. Generative development in the form of refinements, adaptations, and maturation of the basic structures are not of concern in
drawing the becoming/being boundary.
But what counts as the "basic structure" and when is its generation
complete? This is probably a more difficult question empirically than
it is conceptually. Conceptually, the answer is not hard to find. The
metamorphic phase of generative development (Le. the "fundamental"
differentiation) is complete when (I) the organism has assumed its
basic gross anatomical form, normal or not (by which I mean its
basic skeletal structure, musculature, arrangement of organ masses,
and distribution of tissues); (2) the organism's inventory (normal or
not) of histolOgically differentiated organs is complete.
This is not, notice, a functional criterion so much as an anatomical
one. That the developing embryo is "alive"-Le. functioning as a biological organism-is assumed. The question is when, in the course of its
development, we may say that its fundamental or metamorphiC generative development is at an end.
It seems indisputable that the end cannot be put any earlier than
the point described above. Mter all, if anything is basic to human
generative development (beyond conception) it is the shaping of the
formless mass of cells into the shape and general arrangement of
parts which the continuous and regenerative processes of development will maintain. And an "organ" which is not histolOgically differentiated is no organ at all. I do not think anyone would want to hold
that the generation of organs was not a part of basic generative
development. So the boundary can surely not be put any earlier than
the point I have described. And to put the point later than that-to
require, for example, that the differentiation of the ciliary muscles of
the eye be complete-stretches the notion of fundamental or basic
structures beyond reasonable bounds. I do not mean to claim that the
distinction between basic and nonbasic generative development is
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conceptually crisp-such that, given any example of generative development, it could be unarguably classified in one and only one of the
categories. I merely hold-and will argue below-that the distinction
is clear enough for the use we need to make of it.
The empirical question, however, may be more difficult-or at least
it seems so to a nonbiologist reading the standard sources. The completion of gross anatomical form is not much of a problem. That is
virtually complete by the end of the third lunar month of gestationso much so that aborted fetuses of that age can be used in place of
cadavers to teach anatomy to medical students. "... [W]ith the aid of
a simple magnifier, every gross anatomical detail can be seen."8 Further changes in morphology (e.g. as late as those occurring during
puberty) are either the regional growth of existing structures, or
clearly in the category of refinements, adaptation, and maturation of
those structures.
The histogenesis of organs is a more difficult matter. It is clear that
very few organs are histologically differentiated at the end of the
third lunar month. Indeed, development of the alveolar ducts and the
formation of elastic tissue in the lungs occurs well into the sixth
lunar month. 9 Parts of the digestive system (e.g. esophageal glands)
are defined even later. 1o The timetable for these later developments
is not terribly precise, and no doubt can never be, due to individual
variations. But it seems true to say that the end of what I am calling
the metamorphic phase of generative development can be put no
earlier than the middle of the sixth lunar month of gestation and
need not be put any later than the middle of the final month-generative development thereafter clearly falling into the refinement, adaptation, and maturation category. (The various skeletal rearrangements,
8. Hans Elias, Basic Human Anatomy as Seen in the Fetus (St. Louis, I97I),
p. vii.
9. "Primary ossification centers of the pharyngeal arches appear . . . the
circular ciliary muscles of the eye are differentiating .... The lumina of parotid
and sublingual glands are established ... primordia of Peyer's patches appear
in the ileum. . . . Development of the alveolar ducts including the formation
of elastic tissue is prominent. . . . The hyaloid artery of the eye begins to
degenerate." J.B. Thomas, Human Embryology, pp. 280-28I.
IO. Ibid., p. 297.
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the myelization of neural tissue, the proliferation of alveoli, and
gametogenesis are all clearly in the nonbasic category.)
Suppose, then, just for the argument, that we say that the metamorphic phase of generative development is complete at the beginning
of the eighth month. Are we then in a position to defend the claim that
such a fetus is a human being as opposed to a human becoming?
Reasons have been given for the contention that the becoming/being
boundary cannot be put any earlier than this-that is, that the completion of generative metamorphosis is a necessary condition for
entry into the class of human beings. But is it also a sufficient condition? Are there good reasons for thinking that the completion of the
metamorphic phase of generative development is enough to count as
crossing the becoming/being boundary? I think there are good reasons-conclusive ones in fact-but they are of a negative sort. That is,
I think the reasons consist in there being no good reasons for requiring
anything further by way of a condition. The clearest way to show
this is by dealing with some obvious objections to the metamorphic
definition as here proposed.

III.

OBJECTIONS TO THE METAMORPHIC DEFINITION

Imprecision

It may be argued that the obvious imprecision in the timetable of metamorphosis is intolerable, as one cannot know in advance-at various
points in the last few months of gestation-whether, for example, a particular abortion will be homicide or not.
The reply to this objection may be brief. We are faced with many
such uncertainties in both the law and morality. Often we have to
deal with a process and need to know precisely when it was "complete," but find the difficulties nearly insuperable. Consider the notorious difficulties of distinguishing an attempted crime (an indictable
offense) from the mere preparation to attempt it (which is not an
indictable offense).l1 Such problems cannot be solved, they can only
I!. See, for example, a standard hornbook on the substantive criminal law:
Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Handbook on Criminal Law (St.
Paul, 1972), pp. 431-438. For a review of some of the cases and comment on the
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be handled. And in the case of the definition of "human being," if it
is to figure in the administration of a stringent prohibition of homicide,
it seems reasonable to adopt an empirically conservative presumption. If basic, generative differentiation has ever been known to be
(or can reasonably be thought to have been) complete by the end of
the first week of month seven, then one might invoke the presumption
of homicide for the destruction of any fetus reasonably believed to
be in or beyond the seventh month of gestation. Or one might want to
adopt a series of increasingly strong standards of care, beginning at
the latest point at which the process can be guaranteed to be incomplete.12 In any case this is a practical problem of a sort endemic to law
and morality, and it is safe to say that the leading alternative candidates for the becoming/being distinction (Le. conception, viability,
and the development of personality) are also subject to it. It cannot, therefore, constitute any special objection to the metamorphiC
definition.

Mutation and Arrested Development
A critic may want to know more, however, about how the definition
handles cases of mutation and arrested development. What about the
fetus which develops no limbs, or only one kidney, or a heart with
only three valves?
Here it helps to remember that the metamorphiC definition-beyond
requiring genetic material from the species-is phrased in terms of
the development of each individual. Whether that individual has a
genetic anomaly which causes ~ mutation in form or organ inventory,
or whether environmental factors put a premature end to development
is irrelevant. If the fetus (mutant or not) dies or is killed before the
completion of the metamorphiC phase of its generative development,
then what has died or been killed is a human becoming. If the fetus
survives, and the process of differentiation is complete, yet the fetus
is not normally formed, then what lives is a non-normally formed
philosophical aspects of the problem, see my article, "Criminal Attempt and
the Theory of the Law of Crimes," Philosophy & Public Affairs 3, no. 3 (Spring
1974): 262-294.
12. The Supreme Court has done something similar in its recent abortion
decision. See Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. lI3, 41 LW 4213 (1973) at 4214·
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human being. If the fetus is born prior to the completion of the process, but given the proper environment, can survive while the process
continues to completion, then what has been born is a human becoming. It should be noted that none of this implies, by itself, the
existence or nonexistence of specific duties toward such fetuses. The
morality of the treatment of fetuses of various sorts and in various
stages of development is a matter for further argument. It is no objection to the metamorphic definition to show that it does not settle such
matters.

Alternatives to the Metamorphic Definition
The first two objections aside, there may be some remaining feeling
that the choice of the metamorphic definition is as arbitrary as several other alternatives. Even if conception and the terminus of the
twinning possibility have been ruled out, why not choose the concept
of viability-on the grounds, perhaps, that a human being is not a
biological parasite, but that the fetus is just that until the point of
viability? Or why not choose quickening or live birth or the development of personality? To relieve this dissatisfaction, it will be necessary to say a few words about some of the other standard candidates
for the becoming/being boundary.
The viability alternative is unsatisfactory. It confuses a criterion
with a definition. Viability is not a definition of ''human being." One
can, after all, have a nonviable (but temporarily alive) human being.
Viability is rather, in fact, a rough criterion for the completion of the
process of metamorphosis. Viability (outside the mother's body and
outside mechanical facsimilies of it) COincides-roughly-with the end
of basic histogenesis as here described.
Other alternatives to the metamorphic definition have even less
plausibility. "Quickening" has nothing to recommend it even initially
-unless it is confused with viability. The point of "live birth" is
flatly arbitrary, bearing as it does no necessary relation to properties
of the fetus. It has some advantages as a legal device for fixing age,
but beyond that, has nothing to recommend it. 13 And the development
13. That is, there is nothing to recommend it as a becoming/being boundary.
As a moral distinction based on the fact that the neonate immediately begins
"to play an explicit role within the social structure of the family and society"

Philosophy & Public Affairs

of "personhood," as a definition of human being, only has interest if
one is singlemindedly trying to build up a definition which will yield
"rights to life"-where such rights are understood to arise only from
the claims one agent may make on another. It taxes the concept of
membership in the species too far to say that a fourteen-year-old, so
catastrophically deficient as to warrant the claim that he or she is not
a "person," is not a member of the species.

The Moral Emptiness of the Definition
But then, it may be urged, one has abandoned any attempt to make
the becoming/being boundary a moral divide. One can understand
how quickening might be held to have characteristics relevant to a
moral boundary-for it has a psychological impact on the pregnant
woman and others. Similarly with live birth and the development of
personality. But "the end of the metamorphic phase of generative developmenf' does not seem to capture any morally significant distinction. And the resistance to adopting a morally empty definition, given
our actual use of rough and ready becoming/being boundaries as
moral divides is strong. As Tooley and others have argued, if the
legitimacy of moral prohibitions and permissions (say, with regard
to killing) are going to rest on whether or not the victim has crossed
the becoming/being boundary, then the drawing of that boundary
must be done in terms of characteristics relevant to the moral justification of those prohibitions and permissions. 14 This is an important
line of argument, so I want it to be clear why I reject its applicability
here.
In the first place, I think we may plaUSibly reject quickening and
live birth as candidates for the sort of moral divide at stake here. We
are, after all, talking about duties not to kill, and the sort of psychological pulls created by these two events (aside from the fact that not
every parent will feel them) are just not the sort of grounds advocates
of a morally relevant definition are interested in. They are interested
there may be more to say for it. See H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr., "The Ontology
of Abortion," Ethics 84 (1974): 217-234, especially pp. 230-232.
14. See Michael Tooley, "Abortion and Infanticide," Philosophy & Public
Affairs 2, no. I (Fall 1972): 37-65.
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in justifying a right in the victim not to be killed-a so-called right
to life.
Now if one tries to derive the moral rules concerning homicide from
special rights to life possessed by the victims and wants to show that
those rights to life are derived from some characteristics which define
the victims as human beings, then the metamorphic definition is
indeed beside the point. So, I believe, are all other nontheological
definitions except personhood. The question really is, then, why not
adopt personhood as the becoming/being boundary? Even if it leads·
to unpleasant conclusions such as a failure to rule out infanticide, at
least it marks a moral divide of major proportions. Persons-more
exactly, self-conscious subjects of experience-can value themselves.
And in just the same sense in which my values for my act A support
the rationality of that act A, so too another person's values against
(my act) A support the rationality of (my act) non-A. Thus there is
one clear sense in which persons can make claims on us which nonpersons cannot make. And since the making of such claims has an
obvious application to the question of homicide, it is tempting to try to
base one's account of the morality of homicide on such claims.
But I think it is not usually recognized just how unsatisfactory this
whole approach is. For one thing, though an obviously sound basis for
moral argument, it is a very slender reed on which to hang the whole
analysis of homicide. To suppose that all our duties not to kill come
from the victim's rights (to life, liberty, or whatever), and that those
rights are grounded in the victim's ability (and title) to claim certain
acts and forbearances from others, is to put oneself in a very awkward
position theoretically-not to say morally. What account is one to give,
then, of a parent's duties to his or her infant offspring? What account
is one to give of our duties not to kill the sleeping? Or temporarily
comatose? Or our duties to resucitate those who have drowned? One
is forced, on this account, either to deny the existence of such duties or
to construct an account of how such duties can arise from counterfactual conditions (Le. if B were awake, or at the age of reason, or
alive again, he would lay claim on me for X).
Surely either of these positions is implausible. The counterfactual
account is an awkward contrivance in many of these cases. But beyond
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that, both alternatives ignore some obviously sound lines of moral
argument which derive duties from considerations which begin with
the agent, rather than with the one acted upon. A duty not to kill (or
a duty to rescue) may be justified by reference to the consequences
for the agent or society. It may be justified as an entailment of the
agent's role (parent, doctor, friend). Or it may be justified as a requirement of those patterns of life or character traits of which we can
justifiably approve, morally. None of these justifications makes essential reference to the victim's ability and-title to lay claim to the duty.
Now I am not suggesting that such agent-based approaches can,
by themselves, be any more adequate than the victim-based approach.
A general account of the morality of killing which ignored the victim's
claims on the agent would be indefensibly incomplete. But so is an
account which ignores the agent-based approaches. And once the
need for both sorts of approaches is recognized, the attempt to rig a
definition of "human being" along the lines suggested by any single
line of argument (whether victim-based or not) seems arbitrary in the
extreme. There can, for example, be no a priori guarantee that the
range of entities protected by duties generated from agent-based approaches will coincide exactly with those protected by duties generated
from victim-based approaches. So at the least it is certainly an invitation to question-begging to force the terms ''human being" and ''homicide" into the area circumscribed by the victim-based approach.
Further, of course, the question of homicide not only involves
threshold problems (i.e. whether the victim is a human being or not).
I t also involves giving a rationale for retaining or rejecting all the
intricacies of homicide law-the grading of various sorts of homicide,
the exculpatory claims we recognize, and the category of justifiable
homicide. Any "right to life" which could conceivably be encapsulated
in a definition of ''human being" would prove an infertile ground
indeed for these matters. Consider: appeals to personhood are of no
avail in explaining the distinctions we draw between deaths produced
by tortious negligence, criminal negligence, and premeditated acts of
murder. Human victims of each have, one assumes, an equal "right to
life," and surely, with respect only to that right, no less a claim on their
fellows for reasonable care as for nonmalicious conduct.
It is, of course, possible to build up an account of the details of

35 1

Human Being: The Boundaries

homicide law by reference to other principles, using the "right-to-life"
notion merely as a starting point. But then one must acknowledge,
surely, that the "right to life" is itself very nearly vacuous, morally. It
functions as nothing more than a general presumption against a certain restricted class of morally problematic killings, and even then it
is not relevant to deciding many of the questions we need answered
about homicide. This, together with the difficulties of even explicating
any morally relevant definition of the "point of entry into humanness"
shows, I think, that the objection of vacuousness against the metamorphic definition is without much force.
Indeed, I reiterate that the primacy of the right-to-life line of argument is a snare. A much more straightforward, and thus conceptually
clear, approach is simply to ask what presumptions against the taking
of life there are, and why, and under what conditions those presumptions may be overcome. A consideration of right-claims made by one
agent on another will be a part of this approach, but it is clear that the
approach will not be limited to such considerations. Presumptions
with regard to the taking of all lives (vegetable, animal, human, potential, or actual) will be confronted directly-not through a mystifying (and doubtless largely self-serving) thicket of special rights
definition ally borne by human beings.
This approach to the morality of homicide seems to me to offer
more hope of productive, reasoned discussion than do the usual arguments. It will not be easy to specify the grounds for or against a strong
presumption concerning the homicide of the fetus of eight months as
opposed to a weaker presumption, or none at all, against feticide prior
to eight months. But at least the need for argument and the general
range of relevant considerations will not be obscure. One may want to
begin with a consideration of the prohibition of homicide in the case
of healthy adult victims. One would ask for the jUstification of the
prohibition and for the justification of the various exculpatory claims
we allow (or ought to allow). One would then work out to threshold
questions, such as abortion and euthanasia, in stages, asking the same
questions for each stage. Such a process would be uncomfortable,
because it would call into question one of our most central and deeply
felt moral principles. But unless wisdom profits from evasion, this is
exactly what needs to be done. The definition of the becoming/being

35 2

Philosophy & Public Affairs

boundary bears no a priori relevance to this sort of investigation.
And if there is a cogent biological definition of the boundary-as I have
argued there is-there is no point in resisting it for the purposes of
moral theory.

IV. THE BEING/HAS-BEEN BOUNDARY
I said at the outset that the definition of "human being" had to separate
not only "being" from "becoming" but also "being" from "has been." I
want to conclude by deploying an argument to do this-both to complete the promise and to underline my point about the proper approach
to the morality of homicide. Given the fervor with which the definition
of death is being discussed currently, the brevity of the argument to
follow may be perceived as a fault. But I believe that, unlike the
becoming/being distinction, the definition of death presents no serious
conceptual problems. There are serious empirical problems associated
with the clinical determination of when death occurs, and serious
moral problems concerning the treatment of the dying and the dead,
but those are separate matters. I shall comment on their relation to the
definition of death as the argument proceeds.
On the view proposed here a human being is a biological organism,
complete as a living "being" of the species when the metamorphic
phase of generative development is complete. Death for such an
organism is the same as for any other complex organism. It is a
process. The process is, at least in part, a biological one. The completion of the biological part of the process is a necessary condition
for its completion per se. This much I take as not needing argument.
I further take it that we may plausibly regard organic death as the
completion of the biological part of the "exit process." This introduces
an apparent asymmetry into the account, for the becoming/being
boundary was drawn in terms of structure, not function. But it should
be remembered that the organic life of the developing entity was presupposed as a necessary condition of "human-beinghood." It simply
was shown not to be a sufficient condition. But just as organic life
precedes the generation of the structures necessary for entry into
human-beinghood, so too death precedes the physical disintegration
of (most of) those structures. Since life is a necessary condition for
biological entry into human-beinghood, its removal (death) is suf-
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ficient for marking the completion of the biological part of exit from
human-beinghood. The exit process, then, in its biological aspects, is
to be construed as a loss of function, not structure.
The being/has-been boundary can thus not be put any earlier than
the biological death of the organism. And I shall assume that human
beings are mortal in such a way that there is no question but that
biological death is a sufficient condition for marking the being/hasbeen boundary. I assume, in particular, that consciousness does not
persist beyond organic death.
The interesting question is, of course, What counts as the death of
a human being considered as a biological organism? Clearly, parts of
an organism may die without bringing about the death of the organism as such. Organisms may lose parts (limbs or organs) and
continue to function organically. They are not "partially dead" for that
reason. They are simply organisms of a certain type without certain
parts. Further, organisms may lose functions necessary to their sur~
vival. If these functions are provided mechanically, and thus the
organism survives as an organism, it is not dead, it is simply an organism kept alive mechanically.
The biological death of a human organism may be quite straightforwardly described: a human organism is dead when, for whatever
reason, the system of those reciprocally dependent processes which
assimilate oxygen, metabolize food, eliminate wastes, and keep the
organism in relative homeostatis are arrested in a way which the
organism itself cannot reverse. It is the confluence of these and only
these conditions which could possibly define organic death, given the
nature of human organic function. Loss of consciousness is not death
any more than is the loss of a limb. The human organism may continue to function as an organic system. Further, though the loss of one
vital function (say loss of the capacity to eliminate wastes) may
inevitably bring about death, it does not constitute death by itself. Nor
would we even say that an arrest of all the vital functions, in such a
way that the organism itself could "restart" them, was death. (Con. sider the legal fate of one who maliciously intervened to prevent the
"restart." Surely we would regard such a person as a murderer, and we
would not be speaking metaphorically. On the other hand, when an
organism has failed in such a way that it cannot restart its organic
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processes, but could be resuscitated by someone else, what would be
the legal fate of one who maliciously refused to resuscitate? Surely
not an indictment for murder.)
Now it may be objected that requiring the confluent cessation of all
the organic functions mentioned is too strong. First, they usually do
not cease simultaneously, and second, it would be somewhat strange
to withhold the judgment of death from an organism whose sole remaining organic function was some waning remnant of the digestive
process, such as the action of enzymes in the intestines. True. But
the definition proposed here does not entail such a result. Death is
defined as the conjoint (not necessarily simultaneous) cessation of
the system of those reciprocally dependent processes which assimilate
oxygen, etc. Some of these processes involve the production of biochemical agents (e.g. enzymes) which, as to their continued existence
and operation, are then relatively independent of the processes which
produced them. But the continued action of such agents, in the
absence of the process which produced them, cannot properly be
considered the continuance of the process. It is rather the action of
isolated remnants of a process which has itself disintegrated. There
are many such events which continue as artifacts of vital processes
after death. A cell may live, though the organ of which it is a part is
dead (i.e. no longer functions as an integrated subsystem of an
organism). An organ or tissue may remain functional for days after
the death of the organism as a whole (as with the cornea or blood
removed from the body or skin kept protected from bacteria). None
of these events embarrass the definition of death given here.
I t should be emphasized, however, that this definition of death is to
be sharply distinguished from the notion of a clinical criterion for the
death of a given individual. When we may correctly say that an organism has ceased to function as an organism in the requisite sense
is an empirical problem of considerable delicacy. Fortunately for
moral purposes, the functional disintegration of the human organism
(if not mechanically assisted) is marked by reasonably unambiguous
clinical signs whose "appearance" (e.g. the registering of cardiopulmonary failure) takes a relatively short duration. So no one
exercising reasonable care is likely to have to rush the determination.
(Certain emergency situations are, of course, exceptions.)
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Where mechanical assistance is provided to maintain organic function, the implications of the definition of the human being/has-been
boundary are fairly clear. One whose heart no longer functions and
who is kept alive by machine is just that-a human being whose heart
does not function. One who, after a massive accident, has a flat electroencephalogram and no spontaneous respiration, heart activity, or
kidney function, and whose organs are bypassed or kept functioning
by heroic medicine is just that. The definition makes no reference to
the "higher" functions characteristic of humans or to how organic
function is maintained. (After all, in the ninth month of gestation, not
very many "higher" functions are going on, and the fetus functions as
an organism partly by virtue of assistance provided by the mother's
body.)
This is, surely, not only a common-sense view, but one which faces
the moral problems raised by heroic medicine and euthanasia directly.
The moral question here is not whether the permanently comatose are
"really human." The question is, Under what circumstances ought one
to use heroic measures on humans who would otherwise die, and once
in use, under what circumstances may they be withdrawn? Similarly
for questions of "positive" euthanasia. Much clarity is lost, I think, by
organizing inquiries into these matters in terms of a definition of
"human being" which settles the issues. Such definitions merely push
the important questions back one notch (or worse, allow people to
evade them), and inevitably seem ad hoc in nature.
Locutions such as "brain death" are thus misleading when construed as definitions of death. Brain death is not a definition of death,
nor even a criterion of death. It is merely a criterion for deciding
when coma is irreversible. 15 The moral question, accurately put, is,
What should be done with human beings who are in irreversible coma?
There is considerable pressure to resist this conclusion and to allow
physicians to pronounce death upon a finding of irreversible coma. 16
IS. The Harvard Medical School panel charged with defining "brain death"
conflates these questions misleadingly. See their report in Henry K. Beecher,
Research and the Individual (Boston, 1970), pp. 3II-3I9.
16. As recommended by the Harvard panel, ibid., and as is beginning to get
legal recognition, both in cases and in statutes. See, for example, the Kansas
statute defining death, reprinted in Jay Katz, Experimentation with Human
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The motives behind the move are not hard to discern. Beyond a point
which can be specified empirically with some accuracy, hope for
bringing the patient back to any form of consciousness-no matter
how rudimentary-is simply gone. The brain literally liquifies. And
even with the most sophisticated mechanical aids, the other vital
organs begin a slow but certain course of degeneration. Leaving aside
the. desire of some for organs suitable for transplantation, it is an
enormously expensive and futile effort to keep such hopelessly comatose patients aliveY To be able to pronounce them dead would be a
great convenience. It would eliminate any legal hazards involved in
"pulling the plug" (for if such patients are regarded as living, turning
off the respirators or other devices already in use amounts to active,
rather than passive, euthanasia-to killing rather than to letting die).
There are, in most cases, no legal obligations to begin such treatment
(no legal duty to rescue); but there are often moral obligations, because it is often not clear before the efforts are made whether or not
the patient is in irreversible coma. The irony is that once treatment is
begun, there is often a legal obligation to continue, although there
may be no moral obligation to do so.
Rigging the definition of death to solve this problem, while tempting, is an avoidance of the real issue. The real issue is whether and,
if so, when it is moral to give up trying to prolong the patient's life.
Putting this question in terms of euthanasia or even "letting people
die" is a misleading sensationalization of the issue. Euthanasia is certainly an important moral question in its own right, but the typical
medical situations-at least the ones in which the temptation to bring
in the definition of "human being" arises-are those in which efforts
to prolong life are underway, and the question is whether it makes
sense to go on with them. "Giving up" is not always irrational or
Beings (New York, I973), p. I08S, and also the discussion of cases, pp. I076I077,II02-II04·
I7. For the presentation of a startling argument that we need to pronounce

death in these cases precisely so we can not pull the plug but repeatedly "harvest" this new sort of corpse-for the blood it continues to produce, as an experimental object, as a training object for medical students, etc., see Willard
Gaylin, "Harvesting the Dead," Harper's, September I974, pp. 23-30.
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immoral-and certainly not always illegal. Is It seems best to face this
problem directly-by defining when it is permissible to give up lifesaving efforts-and not to evade the problem by introducing an ad hoc
definition of death.
The being/has-been boundary thus should not be, by itself, a moral
divide any more than the becoming/being boundary is. People live,
but sometimes in such hopeless conditions that one may morally and
legally give up trying to save them. People die, but sometimes can
be revived. Their death does not in itself relieve us of moral obligations toward them. 19 The reversibility of death is more likely the
18. It has been argued that what I have called "giving up" should be regarded
in law as a nonculpable omission. See George P. Fletcher, "Prolonging Life,"
Washington Law Review 42 (1967): 999. It is a persuasive argument.
19. Consider the astonishing case reported by Beecher, Research and the Individual, p. 160, n. 8:
A 5-year-old boy, for example, was submerged for 22 minutes in a Norwegian
river at a temperature of -10°C. Before he went under, he was seen in the
water clinging to the ice. Doubtless his body temperature rapidly fell during
this period, and the resulting hypothermic state probably accounts for his
survival. Although the boy seemed to be dead, with blue-white skin and widely
dilated pupils, he was given mouth-to-mouth insufflation. The mouth and
pharynx were filled with vomitus. This was partially cleared. No pulse was
felt. The trachea was intubated, the airway aspirated, artificial respiration
instituted, and external heart compression started at once and continued on
the way to the hospital. On arrival, there was some evidence of peripheral circulation. The ear lobes became pink. The heart was pricked with a needle and
epinephrine and procaine were administered, without apparent result. Blood
was withdrawn for typing and for determining the extent of hemolysis. Two
and one-half hours after submersion, the heart started to contract spontaneously. Chlorpromazine was administered in an effort to improve the peripheral circulation. Gasping breaths now followed and soon became normal, but
in an hour pulmonary edema appeared. Lanatoside and theophyllamine and
morphine were given to control it. Three more pulmonary edema episodes
ensued. An exchange transfusion was given to eliminate the free hemoglobin
and potassium. Respiratory failure occurred five times in the next 24 hours.
Hydrocortisone, antibiotics, heparin, and chlorpromazine were given. He was
transfused. Examination two days after the accident showed no pupillary or
corneal reflexes and no reaction to painful stimuli. On the fifth day, these
signs returned. In a week, the boy began to swallow and to cough. On the
tenth day he could obey simple commands, recognize his mother, and say
"Yes," or "No." The next day he began to shriek and became restless and
unconscious. Except for the brief period mentioned, he was unconscious for
about six weeks. The agitated period lasted 14 days. He seemed to be decerebrated. Gradual improvement followed, but he appeared to be blind. Six weeks
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moral divide. But even irreversible death does not (under our ordinary
convictions) mean we can do just as we please with what remainse.g. the estate; the body. The morality of dealing with the dead,
whether reversibly dead or not, is a matter for further argument. It
is not settled by this definition of death.
Bizarre questions may be raised, of course. Is a human brain separated from its body and kept "functioning" a human being? (Assuming that the removal of limbs or eyes or heart and lungs would still
"leave" a human being.) I admit to being at a loss for a reply to such
cases, let alone an answer.
But the inability of a definition to settle bizarre cases need not be
considered an overwhelming defect. Bizarre cases can often be settled only by equally bizarre definitions. The definitions proposed here
-for both the becoming/being and the being/has-been boundariesmake good sense conceptually, are sufficiently clear for moral purposes, and direct our attention to the moral issues surrounding homicide in a productively direct way. That much, it seems to me, is
enough to expect from definitions.

To summarize the conclusions, then, from the somewhat tortuous
path just trod: I have argued that
( I) There are rationally preferred choices for both the becoming/
being and being/has-been boundaries, drawn in purely biological terms. The former boundary lies at the completion of the
metamorphic phase of generative development; the latter at
the functional disintegration of the human being considered as
a biological organism.
(2) Neither of these boundaries is, by itself, a moral divide.
after the accident his mental condition improved. He began to speak, but
still seemed to be blind. A week later, his vision began to return. On discharge,
two-and-a-half months after the accident, he behaved like a normal child,
except for a little ataxia. Six months after the accident, his mental condition
was almost normal for his age, although he was still clumsy, and peripheral
vision was reduced. Neurologic examination, including an electroencephalogram, was normal. By the usual clinical standards, he behaved as a normal
child.
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(3) Each of the boundaries is precise enough for use as a moral
divide if further argument establishes the legitimacy of it.
(4) Such further argument cannot reasonably be only of the
"victim's right-to-life" variety.
(5) As it turns out, on the abortion question, the United States
Supreme Court's advocacy of graduated stages of state interest
fits the becoming/being boundary reasonably well.
(6) "Brain death" is neither a definition of, nor a criterion for,
the being/has-been boundary.
Doubtless other conclusions are implicit in the arguments. For the
moment I content myself with these.

